In infrastructure planning, more and more citizens are participating in decision making process. Such process is often called ''participatory planning.'' This paper focuses on the aspect of participatory planning as an ''institutionalized'' conflict. In an institutionalized conflict, only a few players can take actions. Other citizens can observe a development of the conflict, but they can affect the process only indirectly. Players try to behave according to the preferences of their ''supporters.'' In such a conflict, players need to communicate with supporters to know their preferences. However, players and supporters cannot necessarily share the knowledge about interaction of players' behaviors (strategies), and they tend to use more simplified mechanisms. Under such simplified mechanisms, players may take different behavior principles, and a final outcome of a conflict can be changed.
Introduction
In infrastructure planning, more and more citizens are participating in decision making process. Such process is often called ''participatory planning.'' Participatory planning can be justified from the following reasons.
1. Understanding Citizens' Preferences: As far as central and local governments understand citizens' needs for infrastructure, governments can design appropriate alternatives to maximize social welfare. However, in many developed countries, the stock of infrastructure has been accumulated, and it has satisfied a minimum requirements. Under such circumstances, citizens are having different preferences on public services, and governments are feeling more difficulty in knowing citizens' needs for infrastructure. Through the process of participatory planning, governments can understand citizens' diverse preferences. 2. Coordinating Different Interests: Stakeholders with different interests are often involved in a infrastructure project. Such difference can be regarded as ''a source of a conflict.'' Without participatory planning process, a conflict may fall into an exchange of disordered and antagonistic behaviors. Participatory planning can be interpreted as the process for ''institutionalizing'' conflicts and coordinating interests. In this paper, behaviors in the ''institutionalized'' conflict are focused on. It is assumed that only a few players can take actions in participatory planning process, and other citizens can observe the process, but they can affect the process only indirectly. Players represent the part of the citizens (called ''supporter'') respectively, and players try to behave according to their supporters' preferences. In other words, citizens' preferences are summarized into players' behavior principles. Since the number of players is limited, communication between them becomes relatively easy, and coordination of behaviors may be possible. In actual cases, players include governments, private companies, environmental activist groups, local residents groups, etc. Once players' behavior principles are determined, players' interaction can be modeled by using non-cooperative game theory.
In an institutionalized conflict, players need to communicate with supporters to know their preferences. However, players and supporters cannot necessarily share the knowledge about interaction of players' behaviors. When players explain supporters about the structure of non-cooperative game model and summarize their opinions, the cost for processing information can become very large. Therefore, in reality, players and supporters may tend to use more simplified mechanisms, in which only limited information is exchanged. Under such simplified mechanisms, players may take different behavior principles, and final outcome of a conflict can be changed.
In this paper, an institutionalized conflict in participatory planning is assumed, and an appropriate opinionsummarizing mechanism between players and supporters is examined. First, the conflict in participatory planning is modeled as non-cooperative game. Then, the relationship between an opinion-summarizing mechanism and an outcome of the conflict is analyzed, and the mechanism based on preference on actions may lead to inefficient outcome. It is also Interdisciplinary Information Sciences, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 69-79 (2005) shown that the effect of opinion-summarizing mechanisms depends on the structure of a conflict.
Modeling a Conflict

Modeling a conflict
In this paper, a conflict is described by using Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) by Fang et al. (1993) . Let the set N (N ¼ f1; 2; . . . ; ng) be the set of n players, and the set K (K ¼ fk 1 ; k 2 ; . . . ; k u g) be the set of states, which can be interpreted as the potential outcomes of a conflict. n-tuple fD i g (i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n) are defined as the set of directed graph
The nodes of the directed graph D i are the elements of the set K. The set of links V i represents the set of player i's possible moves between states. Let k l k m be the link from the state k l to the state
, player i can move from k l to k m with its own initiative (unilaterally). Player i's cardinal payoff at the state k l is represented by
GMCR is defined as 4-tuple fN; K; V; Åg, here N ¼ f1; 2; . . .
. . . ; Å n g. Additionally, the set S i ðk l Þ is defined as follows.
S i ðk l Þ is the set of player i's possible moves from the state k l . While ordinary non-cooperative game theoretic models define strategies first, GMCR needs the definition of K as the set of possible outcomes of a conflict. In participatory planning, people's main attention is ''What is the final outcome of a conflict?'' rather than ''Which action (strategy) can be taken by each player?''. From this viewpoint, GMCR is appropriate for modeling a conflict in participatory planning.
Conflict in participatory infrastructure planning
Using GMCR, a conflict in participatory infrastructure planning is modeled. the following situation is assumed. . Government plans a infrastructure project, and the project is supported by al least some part of citizens. . However, some citizens care about the project's effect on regional environment, and organizes an opposition group. . The opposition group asks for postponing or modifying the project, and its opinion is supported by some part of citizens. Let the opposition group and the government be players 1 and 2, respectively (That is, N ¼ f1; 2g). For simplicity, possible outcomes are limited into the following four states (That is, u ¼ 4).
State 1 (k 1 ): An opposition campaign is escalated, and the project is modified. State 2 (k 2 ): An opposition campaign is escalated, and the project is not modified. State 3 (k 3 ): An opposition campaign is moderated, and the project is modified. State 4 (k 4 ): An opposition campaign is moderated, and the project is not modified. In this case, the set of possible outcomes is K ¼ fk 1 ; k 2 ; k 3 ; k 4 g. For realizing these outcomes, player 1 (opposition group) can take the action ''escalating an opposition campaign'' or ''moderating an opposition campaign,'' and player 2 (government) can take the action ''modifying the project'' or ''proceeding the original project.'' In the following part of this paper, the set of possible actions which can be taken by player i for realizing outcomes is represented by A i . Players can affect realized outcomes through changing their actions in A i . Player 1 can move between k 1 and k 3 , and between k 2 and k 4 . On the other hand, player 2 can move between k 1 and k 2 , and between k 3 and k 4 . Figure 1 shows directed graphs D 1 and D 2 , which represent players' possible moves.
Modeling sequential behaviors in a conflict
In this paper, the four states shown in Section 2.2 are interpreted as stages in a conflict. In actual conflicts in 
At each state k l , player i moves to other state or stays in k l as determined in i . In other words, player's behavior at each state is programmed in advance by i . Let the set of player i's stationary strategies be Â i . In non-cooperative game, players choose their strategies considering other players' choices. Similarly, in a conflict in participatory infrastructure planning, players choose their stationary strategies considering their counterparts' choices. For simplicity, the following condition is added without loss of generality. Condition 1. Consider the directed graph D i in which both the links k l k m and k m k l exist between states k l and k m . In this case, any stationary strategies of player i include one of the moves from k l to k m and the moves from k m to k l . That is,
Under Condition 1, players' stationary strategies are limited into four strategies shown in Figures 2 and 3 , respectively. Combination of players' stationary strategies is represented by ( ¼ ð 1 ; . . . ; n Þ), and the set of is represented by
. is called ''a strategy profile.'' Players' choices of actions based on their stationary strategies change the stage of a conflict. In this paper, the change of stages is interpreted as a development of a conflict. The outcome of a conflict is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (An Outcome of a Conflict). Under strategy profile , the state k l satisfying the following condition is called the outcome of a conflict under strategy profile , and represented by OðÞ.
When equation (4) is satisfied, any players try to stay at the state k l . By reaching k l , a development of a conflict finishes and k l will be realized.
From Figures 2 and 3 , we find that the conflict becomes a 4 Â 4 non-cooperative strategic form game including 16 patterns of outcomes. In this paper, the non-cooperative game consisting of the set of players N, the set of strategies Â i (i 2 N) and payoff profiles Å i (i 2 N) is called ''a stationary game.'' Table 1 shows the relationship between strategy profiles and outcomes. At hyphenated strategy profiles, the outcome defined in equation (4) does not exist. In actual
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conflicts, the players involved in such situation try to reach an agreement by changing the structure of a game (game form (Aoki, 2001) ). Examples of the new game forms introduced in such situation include intervention of third party (Sakakibara et al., 2002) and direct negotiation between players (Young, 1998) . However, change of a game form generally requires a long time, and such delay in occurrence of an outcome may cause some kinds of a loss. For this reason, it is assumed that the payoffs at the strategy profiles with no outcome are smaller than payoffs at any other outcomes. Additionally, it is assumed that players can take only pure stationary strategies, and mixed strategies are not used in the following analysis.
Since each player chooses its strategy to maximize its payoff at an outcome, Nash equilibrium can be formulated as defined in ordinary non-cooperative game.
Definition 2 (Nash Equilibrium in Stationary Game). In a stationary game, a strategy profile Ã is Nash equilibrium when the following condition is satisfied.
Here ð i ; ÀiÃ Þ means the strategy profile where player i chooses a stationary strategy i and the other players chooses the same stationary strategies as in the strategy profile Ã .
When equation (5) is satisfied, each player does not have an incentive to change its stationary strategy from Ã . Therefore, Ã becomes a self-enforcing agreement between players (Harrington, 1987).
Modeling Communication Scheme in Participatory Planning
3.1 Recognition of a game structure and an opinion-summarizing process in participatory planning
In non-cooperative game theory, incomplete information game (Bayesian equilibrium) by Harsanyi (1967 Harsanyi ( -1968 and learning game models (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998, Young, 1998) describe the situation where players do not have complete knowledge on the structure of a game. In incomplete information game, probability distribution of players' types representing their preferences is common knowledge. In learning game models, the same game is played repeatedly, and expectation on other players' choices is formed. Therefore, learning game model assumes that many times of trial and error are permitted. Additionally, as Oechssler and Schipper (2003) mentioned, players in learning game models learn ''how to play in the given game,'' but do not learn the structure of the game itself.
While Bayesian equilibrium in incomplete information game realizes based on common knowledge on an objective probability distribution of players' types, subjective equilibrium by Kalai and Lehrer (1995) realizes based on players' subjective expectation on other players' types. When subjective and objective expectations coincide accidentally, subjective and objective equilibria also coincide. On the other hand, even if subjective and objective expectations do not coincide, players may not perceive polarization of expectations. Based on the results of an experiment, Oechssler and Schipper (2003) showed that players may not recognize the structure of a game even after repeated plays of the game. They also showed that even the player with wrong recognition may choose the same action as the player with correct recognition.
Uniqueness of a conflict in participatory planning is very large, and the possibility of arising the conflicts with the same structure is very small. Therefore, learning model's assumption that repeated plays form players' expectation is very unrealistic. In participatory planning, players involved in a conflict have to construct a game form without repeated plays, and they need to share the game form. The following parts of this paper focuses on the process that players determine their payoffs (Å i ) based on their supporters' preferences. Figure 4 shows the relationship between players and their supporters assumed in this paper. Supporter 1 (opposition supporter) and supporter 2 (government supporter) have their own preference order on the states of a conflict. Players take actions (choose stationary strategies) according to priority orders reflecting supporters' preference orders indirectly.
Modeling opinion-summarizing process
Supporter i's cardinal evaluation for the state k l is represented by p i l . Then supporter i's preference profile P i is defined as follows.
Players summarize supporters' opinion, then determine their priority orders. Let player i's cardinal evaluation for the state k l be i l . Then player i's priority profile Å i is defined as follows. (7) is same with player i's payoff profile (see Section 2) . In this section, the process for determining Å i from P i is modeled as ''an opinion-summarizing mechanism.'' The message revealed by supporter i in an opinion-summarizing mechanism is represented by the vector & i . Supporter i
i is called ''an opinion revealing rule.'' Using the message & i , the function i specifies a priority profile Å i .
The function i is called ''an opinion-summarizing rule.'' An opinion-summarizing mechanism between player i and supporter i is represented by the pair ð i ; i Þ. In an opinion-summarizing mechanism in Figure 4 , player i chooses its stationary strategy to maximize the payoff i l at an outcome, which is introduced by an opinion-summarizing mechanism ð i ; i Þ. Even if supporter's preference profile P i is same, different opinion-summarizing mechanisms may make differences in a priority profile Å i and may cause the change of Nash equilibrium in stationary game.
Example of opinion-summarizing mechanisms
By changing functions
i and i , we can define many types of opinion-summarizing mechanisms. However, to secure player's legitimacy as an agent of a supporter, an opinion-summarizing mechanism needs to satisfy minimum requirements on reflection of supporter's preference. In this paper, the following condition is proposed as minimum requirement for opinion-summarizing mechanisms to be employed in the conflict explained in Section 2.2.
Superiority of Dominant Actions
p i 1 > p i 3 and p i 2 > p i 4 ) i 1 > i 3 and i 2 > i 4 ð10Þ p i 1 < p i 3 and p i 2 < p i 4 ) i 1 < i 3 and i 2 < i 4 ð11Þ p i 1 > p i 2 and p i 3 > p i 4 ) i 1 > i 2 and i 3 > i 4 ð12Þ p i 1 < p i 2 and p i 3 < p i 4 ) i 1 < i 2 and i 3 < i 4
ð13Þ
Under the opinion-summarizing mechanism satisfying superiority of dominant actions, if a supporter always prefers the states introduced by player's specified action, a player also prefers these states. Equations (10)-(13) are not necessary and sufficient conditions. That is, even if one action is dominant in a player's priority profile Å i , the corresponding action is not necessary dominant in supporter's preference profile P i . In order to obtain basic information on actual opinion-summarizing mechanisms, we carried out the survey on people's recognition on the structure of conflicts (Sakakibara and Kidera, 2004) . As a result, it was shown that people do not necessarily recognize coincidence between actions and outcomes, which is one of the essential premises of a strategic form game. This shows the possibility of polarization between the recognition on ''Which action can I take?'' and ''Which outcome can be realized?''. Based on this observation, two types of opinion-summarizing mechanisms are assumed. In one mechanism, the message & i includes the information on desirable outcomes. In the other mechanism, the message & i includes the information on desirable actions. In the following part, these two mechanisms are formulated.
(a) Outcome-Based Opinion-summarizing Mechanism
The difference of supporter i's desirability for player j's actions 1 and 2 (i ¼ 1; 2, j ¼ 1; 2) In an outcome-based opinion-summarizing mechanism (a), a player ask a supporter to represent preference profile P i , and i l is same with p i l for each player i, supporter i and state k l . Obviously, an outcome-based opinion-summarizing mechanism satisfies superiority of dominant actions.
In an action-based opinion-summarizing mechanism (b), a player asks a supporter to represent information on the difference of supporter's desirability for actions. If i j is greater than zero, supporter i hopes player j to take action 1 rather than action 2. A supporter represents desirability for both players' actions, and the message becomes the vector ð In the following part, an action-based opinion-summarizing mechanism is formulated to satisfy superiority of dominant actions. First, superiority of dominant actions shown in equations (10)- (13) is decomposed into the following two conditions.
Consistency on Supporter's Opinion-Revealing
Consistency on Player's Opinion-summarizing 
Consistency on supporter's opinion-revealing is the condition for opinion revealing rule i , and consistency on player's opinion-summarizing is the condition for opinion-summarizing rule i . First, an opinion-revealing rule satisfying equations (18)- (21) is formulated. It is assumed that a supporter determines weights ; on players' actions (0 < < 1, 0 < < 1), and calculates i j as follows.
Player 1 (Opposition Group)
Escalating an opposition campaign ! ; Moderating an opposition campaign ! 1 À
Player 2 (government)
Modifying the project ! ; Proceeding the original project ! 1 À
, ð1 À Þ, , and ð1 À Þ can be interpreted as supporters' subjective probabilities on players' choices of actions.
After formulating an opinion-revealing rule, an opinion-summarizing rule is determined. It is assumed that player i determines i l as follows, using revealed by supporter i.
An action-based opinion-summarizing mechanism defined in equations (26)-(30) satisfies the following theorem. Theorem 1. In an action-based opinion-summarizing mechanism defined in equations ð26Þ-ð30Þ, an opinionrevealing rule i satisfies consistency on supporter's opinion revealing, and an opinion-summarizing rule i satisfies consistency on player's opinion-summarizing. That is, the opinion-summarizing mechanism satisfies superiority of dominant actions.
Proof of the theorem is given in Appendix. Tables 2 and 3 show the relationship between combination of stationary strategies (a strategy profile) and payoff realized at the corresponding outcome. Table 2 shows player 1's payoffs, and Table 3 shows player 2's payoffs. As modeled in Section 2.3, players choose stationary strategies to maximize payoffs of outcomes, and Nash equilibrium is realized.
Nash equilibrium in action-based opinion-summarizing mechanism
''Determinants'' in Tables 2 and 3 are the critical parameters whose signs (plus or minus) determine players' best response strategies. In case of the first column of Table 2, if   1 1 is positive, player 1's best response strategies are stationary strategies`andˆ. If 1 1 is negative, player 1's best response strategies are stationary strategies À and´. By specifying these determinants, players' best response strategies can be classified. Figure 5 shows six patterns of overlapping of such classification on 
Relationship between Opinion-summarizing Mechanism and Outcome of a Conflict
Cases for comparative study
In this section, outcomes of the following two cases under outcome-based and action-based opinion-summarizing mechanisms are compared. Table 2 . Determinants of player 1's stationary strategies.
Player 2's Stationary Strategy
The most critical issue for supporter 2 is different in cases 1 and 2. In case 1, the states where an opposition campaign is moderated (states 3 and 4) are not always more preferred to the states where an opposition campaign is escalated (states 1 and 2). On the other hand, the states where the project is not modified (states 2 and 4) are always more preferred to the states where the project is modified (states 1 and 3) . Therefore, the most critical issue for supporter 2 in case 1 is that the project is not modified. In case 2, the states where an opposition campaign is moderated (states 1 and 2) are always more preferred to the states where an opposition campaign is escalated (states 3 and 4) . Therefore, the most critical issue for supporter 2 in case 2 is that an opposition campaign is moderated. That is, the difference between two cases is in supporter 2's priority.
Case 1 a) Result under an outcome-based opinion-summarizing mechanism
When an outcome-based opinion-summarizing mechanism formulated in equations (14) and (15) is employed, strategy profiles`-I andˆ-I in Table 1 satisfy the condition of Nash equilibrium. The outcome realized in strategy profiles`-I andˆ-I is the state 2 (an opposition campaign is escalated, and the project is not modified).
b) Result under an action-based opinion-summarizing mechanism
When an action-based opinion-summarizing mechanism formulated in equations (26)- (30) is employed, parameters defined in equations (26)- (29) satisfy the following inequalities.
From these inequalities, the following two patterns of supporter 1 and four patterns of supporter 2 in Table 4 are excluded as unrealized patterns. 
As a result, possible outcomes are eight patterns shown in Table 5 . When an outcome-based opinion-summarizing mechanism formulated in equations (14) and (15) is employed, strategy profiles`-IV andˆ-I in Table 1 satisfy the condition of Nash equilibrium. The outcome realized in strategy profiles`-IV andˆ-I is the state 2 (an opposition campaign is escalated, and the project is not modified), and the state 3 (an opposition campaign is moderated, and the project is modified). Equation (33) implies that the state 3 dominates the state 2.
When an action-based opinion-summarizing mechanism formulated in equations (26)- (30) is employed, parameters defined in equations (26)-(29) satisfy the following inequalities.
Since equations (39)-(42) coincides with equations (34)-(37), eight patterns of possible outcomes exist as shown in Table 5 . In four patterns of Table 5 , only the state 2 is included in the set of possible outcomes. Since the state 2 is dominated by the state 3, the state 2 is the Pareto-inferior outcome. That is, an action-based opinion-summarizing mechanism may lead the conflict to the stationary game where only the Pareto-inferior outcome is realized in Nash equilibrium.
As shown in Table 5 , if 1 1 is larger than zero, only the state 2 becomes an outcome. Positive 1 1 means that supporter 1 prefers player 1's action ''escalating an opposition campaign'' to the action ''moderating an opposition campaign.'' When supporter 1 has the strong belief that ''player 2 will proceed the original project ( is small),'' it sends the antagonistic ( 1 1 > 0) message. Such a message forces player 1 to take the action ''escalating an opposition campaign,'' and the cooperative outcome such as the state 3 becomes difficult to be realized.
Comparison on the effects of opinion-summarizing mechanisms on outcomes
As shown in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, different preference profile in cases 1 and 2 result in the same outcomes under an action-based opinion-summarizing mechanism. The main reason of this coincidence is that 2 1 and 2 2 are always negative in both cases. Differently from case 1, supporter 2 in case 2 attaches greater importance to building consensus with an opposition group than to proceed the project as planned, because the states where an opposition campaign is moderated (states 1 and 2) is more preferred to the states where an opposition campaign is escalated (states 3 and 4). However, under an action-based opinion-summarizing mechanism, such differences in supporter 2's preference are not reflected, and only the information that supporter 2 always wants the project to be proceeded as it planned (p
3 ) is transmitted. As a result, players in case 2 choose the same stationary strategies with the strategies in case 1, and only the antagonistic outcome (the state 2) can be realized.
In case 2, both supporters attach greater importance to their counterparts' choices (modification of the project for supporter 1, moderation of an opposition campaign for supporter 2) than to their own choices. In such an interdependent conflict, an outcome-based opinion-summarizing mechanism is more desirable than an action-based opinion-summarizing mechanism.
In case 1, while supporter 1 regards modification of the project as the most important, supporter 2 regards proceeding the project without modification as the most important. Therefore, both supporters' preferences are in opposition. In such a situation, a compromise between players is inherently difficult, and the difference of opinionsummarizing mechanisms does not necessarily result in the difference in outcomes of a conflict.
Conclusion
This paper focused on communication scheme in an institutionalized conflict in participatory infrastructure planning, where limited number of players takes actions to reflect their supporters' preferences. First, a sequential decision process of development of a conflict was modeled as stationary game. Then, a communication scheme between players and supporters was formulated as an opinion-summarizing mechanism, and superiority of dominant actions was specified as the condition which an opinion-summarizing mechanism should satisfy. Two types of the mechanisms, outcome-based and action-based opinion-summarizing mechanisms, were applied to the conflict on infrastructure project, and it was shown that an action-based mechanism may lead to a Pareto-inferior outcome in case a government supporter attaches greater importance to building consensus with an opposition group than to proceed the project as planned.
In actual conflicts, the possibility that people choose a communication scheme rationally is very small. However, when the institutionalized conflict is regarded as a mean of participatory planning, a communication scheme such as an opinion-summarizing mechanism should be examined and an appropriate scheme should be designed. (22) is always satisfied. Similarly, equations (23)- (25) are satisfied and the condition of consistency on player's opinion-summarizing is fulfilled.
As shown above, the opinion-summarizing mechanism defined in equations (26)-(30) fulfills the conditions of consistency on supporter's opinion-revealing and consistency on player's opinion-summarizing, and the mechanism satisfies superiority of dominant actions.
